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Abstract 
 
This paper looks at the monetary policy decisions of the U.S. Federal Reserve and asks whether those decisions 
have been influenced solely by national concerns, or whether regional factors have played a role.  All of the 
Federal Reserve’s policymakers have some regional identity, i.e., either their positions explicitly carry some 
regional affiliation or their region of origin is a factor that must be considered in the selection process. 
  This research is relevant for the Fed, and it may also be relevant for Europe’s fledgling central bank in 
Frankfurt.  Critics have asserted that ECB policymakers have an incentive to base policy on national 
developments and respond to national political pressures. 
  We find that Fed policymakers do take into account developments in regional unemployment when 
deciding monetary policy, and that these regional developments are more important for central bankers at the 
hub than in the spokes.  These findings are robust to a variety of different specifications of the voting equation. 
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Convenience and efficiency in coin and currency distribution and in check-processing 
may be the  least of the benefits flowing from this far-flung network of offices, 
stretching from Seattle to San Antonio and from Buffalo to Birmingham.  Our System's 
broad geographic reach also ensures  that  we who have the privilege of serving as 
policymakers  – the  presidents of the regional  Banks  and  the Board members in 
Washington  – receive  a clear sense of the economic and  business  life  beyond the 
Beltway, which encircles the nation's capital.  As keen observers of local economies, 
the directors here and elsewhere contribute vitally to the formulation of monetary 
policy by offering important insights absent, by definition, from even the most careful 
analysis of aggregate data.  Often they know what is happening in the various regions 
of the country well before the hard data are collected by national statistical agencies.  
Most importantly, this singular system of broad and diverse representation, nurtured by 
close contacts at the regional and local levels, fosters a long-term perspective and a 
continuity. 
 
Alan Greenspan, December 2000. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
  The Federal Reserve System is a hybrid institution, designed to represent and respond 
to national and regional concerns at the same time.  The Fed’s responsibilities are numerous, 
ranging from the setting of monetary policy for the nation to the supervision of banks and the 
clearing of checks at the local level.  This paper looks at monetary policy decisions and 
whether those decisions have been influenced solely by national concerns, or whether 
regional factors have played a role. 
    In particular, all of the Federal Reserve’s policymakers have some regional identity, 
i.e., either their positions explicitly carry some regional affiliation or their region of origin is 
a factor that must be considered in the selection process.  What we seek to determine is 
whether there is any systematic evidence that policymakers have cast their votes according to 
economic developments in their region rather than focusing exclusively on developments in 
the national economy.  For instance, were policymakers from California more sensitive to 
that state’s sluggish economic performance following the defence cutbacks and base closures 
in the early 1990s?   2
  This research is relevant for the Fed, and it may also be relevant for Europe’s 
fledgling central bank in Frankfurt.  Critics have asserted that ECB policymakers have an 
incentive to base policy on national developments and respond to national political pressures.  
Moreover, since national statistics for each country that has adopted the euro remain the 
major source of information, it is straightforward to assess economic developments from the 
national perspective (much easier, for example, than to judge local developments in the 
United States where fewer disaggregated indicators are published). 
  A generic central bank structure is useful in outlining this problem.  The main office 
of the central bank sits in a single location, with additional regional offices throughout the 
currency area, forming the hub and spokes of the system.  Central bankers in the main office 
and the regional offices participate in monetary policy decisions.  All central bankers, 
whether in the hub or the spokes, by definition have some regional identity.  The question we 
ask in the paper is:  are policymakers in the main office, the regional offices, or both, 
influenced by regional information in making monetary policy decisions?  That is, once area-
wide data are taken into account, do votes of policymakers appear to have been influenced by 
regional developments?  It is possible to examine this hypothesis for the Federal Reserve 
owing to the available detail on meetings and voting records of its monetary policy 
committee.  To preview our results, we find that Fed policymakers do take into account 
developments in regional unemployment when deciding monetary policy, and that these 
regional developments are more important for central bankers at the hub than in the spokes.  
Our findings are robust to a variety of different specifications of the voting equation. 
  This paper is organized as follows:  the next section reviews the literature on 
monetary policy voting in the United States; Section 3 lays out a simple framework for 
analysing our question; Section 4 discusses in detail the Federal Reserve’s policymaking 
structure, our sample of monetary policy votes, and correlations among those votes and 
regional unemployment; Section 5 details our empirical results; Section 6 examines the 
implications of these results for the ECB. 
 3 
2.  Literature Review 
 
The literature on Federal Reserve monetary policy voting can be grouped into two strands:  
first, articles that take inspiration from the partisan theory of politics, and second, articles that 
take inspiration from monetary policy reaction functions. 
The partisan theory of politics is rooted in Hibbs (1977) and refined in Alesina (1987) 
and Alesina and Sachs (1988).  This theory generally assumes that political factors are 
important determinants of behaviour; more specifically, Democrats and Republicans occupy 
different points on the trade-off between unemployment and inflation, with Democrats 
presumed to be less attentive to inflation and more attentive to unemployment than 
Republicans.  Numerous prior studies of Federal Reserve voting  – including articles by 
Belden (1989), Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990), Havrilesky and Gildea (1991, 1992, 1995), 
and Gildea (1990, 1992) – have examined monetary policy votes cast by U.S. central bankers 
at the institutional hub, at the spokes, or both. 
This first strand has generally focused on the background characteristics and political 
affiliations of central bankers and whether those characteristics or affiliations can be used to 
predict votes cast in monetary policy decisions.  Empirical findings from this research are 
that central bankers from the regional offices are more likely to cast dissenting votes in 
monetary policy decisions; dissents are more likely to be for tighter than for easier monetary 
policy; central bankers appointed by Democrats tend to dissent less frequently for tightening 
than central bankers appointed by Republicans; an advanced degree in economics is 
associated with tightening dissents; and number of years in government service is associated 
with easing dissents. 
This literature has been widely perceived as giving strong support for the hypothesis 
that central bankers from regional offices are more independent and more hawkish on 
monetary policy than central  bankers from the main office.  However, there is a major 
empirical flaw with this work in that the voting sample is truncated either by ignoring votes 
cast in agreement with the majority or by looking only at split-decision outcomes.  The 
effects of this sample selection bias are potentially significant.  For example, over the sample 
period examined in this study (1978-2000), split-decisions were recorded in about half of all 
meetings, while dissents were only 8 percent of total votes cast.   4
Turning to the second strand, the literature on monetary policy reaction functions 
generally uses the realized, ex post interest rate as the central bank’s target.
1  However, using 
votes cast by Fed policymakers, Tootell (1991a, 1991b) takes a somewhat different approach, 
estimating an intended, ex ante monetary policy reaction function.  In his framework, votes in 
agreement with the majority as well as dissents are classified as votes for tighter, unchanged, 
or easier policy and explained in terms of forecasts for real output growth and price inflation.  
Contrary to the findings in the partisan strand of the voting literature, Tootell finds no 
evidence of a systematic difference in the voting behaviour of policymakers from the central 
bank’s main office or its regional offices.
2 
Two studies, Gildea (1992) and Tootell (1991a), have asked whether votes cast by 
policymakers from the Fed’s spokes have been influenced by regional information.  While 
Gildea finds some limited evidence that regional developments influence the votes of central 
bankers from regional offices, his results are suspect owing to sample truncation.  Tootell 
finds no statistical support for the hypothesis, however, and his results are robust to a variety 
of different specifications and data definitions.  Our work differs from Tootell’s in three 
major respects:  first, our dependent variable differentiates between votes cast with the 
majority or in dissent; second, the variables we use to measure regional developments are 
calibrated more precisely to the geographical definition of the regions; and third, we take into 
account the regional ties of policymakers in the Fed’s main office as well as the ties of 
officials in the regional spokes in testing whether regional developments influence votes cast. 
 
 
3.  A Simple Framework 
 
An intuitive theoretical framework motivates the empirical approach used in this study.  If i 
indexes voters on the monetary policy committee and t indexes time, we can represent voter 
i’s desired or “target” short-term interest rate STit as 
 
STit = F(Rit, Nt)          (1) 
 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Abrams, Froyen, and Waud (1980). 
2 Tootell does not include social and political factors among his explanatory variables.   5
where R it is a vector of variables describing developments at time t in voter i’s region of 
origin, and Nt is a vector of national variables at time t.
3  We term equation (1) an individual 
reaction function.  A specific example of such a function might be the following linear 
relationship: 
 
STit = ai Rit + ßi Nt          (2) 
 
Equations (1) and (2) suggest that individual voters have different views regarding the 
appropriate short-term interest rate for three reasons:  first, regional information (Rit) may 
vary; second, responsiveness to regional information (ai) may vary; third, responsiveness to 
national information (ßi) may vary (for example, some committee members may want to 
respond more aggressively than others during periods when output is above trend). 
It is not possible to estimate individual v oter reaction functions as described in (2) 
because the STit’s are not observable.  For decisions of the Federal Reserve, variables that are 
observable include the decision of the majority of committee members
4 and in the case of a 
dissent, whether the voter preferred a tighter or easier policy than the majority.  Given 
equation (1), it follows that the decision of the majority of members, STt
c, is a function of 
regional and national variables as described by the policy reaction function 
 
STt
c = G(R1t, . . . , Rnt, Nt)  where i = 1, …, 12  (3) 
 
Equation (3) resembles a conventional monetary policy reaction function, where the majority 
decision is taken as the realized short-term interest rate.  Studies that have estimated such 
policy reaction functions typically ignore any information provided by dissenting votes.
5 
We now define functions h it(Zit) and d it(Zit) as threshold deviations from the 
committee decision STt
c for voter i at time t, where hit(?) > 0 and dit(?) < 0 for all i, t.  Voter i 
will dissent from the committee decision when his desired short-term interest rate is 
sufficiently above or below the rate chosen by the majority.  When 
 
STit - STt
c = hit(Zit)          (4) 
                                                 
3 The regional variables Rit need not be unique to voter i if another member of the monetary policy committee 
hails from the same region. 
4 Since July 1995, the Fed’s monetary policy committee has made public its target for the short-term interest 
rate. 
5 An exception is Tootell (1991a, 1991b).   6
 
then voter i will favour a higher rate (i.e., a more hawkish policy) than the majority, and 
when 
 STit - STt
c = dit(Zit)          (5) 
 
then voter i will favour a lower rate (i.e., a more dovish policy) than the majority. 
In principle (as indicated by the subscripts), the h(?) and d(?) threshold functions may 
vary across time and across individual voters, and may be determined by characteristics such 
as whether the voter is from the main office or a regional office of the central bank, the 
ability of the committee chairman to forge consensus, or the political affiliation of the voter. 
Following from equations (3), (4), and (5), we define a limited dependent variable 





c = hit     VLit = +1, 
dit < STit – STt
c < hit    VLit = 0,    (6) 
STit – STt
c = dit    VLit = -1. 
 
 
4.  The U.S. Federal Reserve 
 
Structure and size 
 
The Federal Reserve System is composed of a central hub – the Board in Washington – and 
twelve regional spokes or “Banks” that are located throughout the country.  The seven central 
bankers at the hub are “Board members,” while the twelve in the regional spokes are “Bank 
presidents.”
8 
                                                 
6 In this framework, the dependent variable will not capture the relative movements of the short-term interest 
rate target over time, since the majority vote is mapped into the value of 0 for every t.  Since our objective is to 
understand what factors explain dissenting votes, this characteristic of our framework is not a concern. 
7 Tootell (1991a, 1991b) employs a limited dependent variable VLt (+1, 0, –1) defined as follows: 
 
VLit = +1  if STit – STt
c = hit  or if dit < STit – STt
c < hit and STt
c – STt–1
c  > 0, 
VLit = 0   if dit < STit – STt
c < hit and STt
c – STt–1
c = 0, 
VLit = -1   if STit – STt
c = dit or if dit < STit – STt
c < hit and STt
c – STt–1
c  < 0. 
 
Tootell’s dependent variable tracks relative changes in the Fed’s interest rate target over time.  Dissents in favor 
of tighter (easier) policy are classified identically to majority decisions for tightening (easing). 
8 For details on the structure of the Federal Reserve System, see Purposes and Functions (1994).   7
  The twelve regions are not equal in size.  Many U.S. states are apportioned to two or 
more of the regional spokes and one state, Missouri, is home to two Federal Reserve Banks.  
The geographical configuration of the system dates to 1914.  Garnering political support for 
passage of the original Federal Reserve Act and balancing the interests of the numerous 
banks in the heartland against the interests of the New York financial community were key to 
the design of the system.
9 
  The size of the twelve Federal Reserve regions can be measured in a number of ways.  
Table 1 looks at size in terms of nominal assets of the regional Federal Reserve Banks, 
population, real output, geographical area, and votes cast.  In terms of assets on the balance 
sheets of the individual Federal Reserve Banks, a rough measure of the financial size of each 
region, New York ranked as the largest region in 1990 with more than one-third of total 
assets, followed by Chicago and San Francisco (which accounted for 13 percent and 10 
percent of the total, respectively).
10  By the asset measure, five of the twelve Federal Reserve 
banks – Dallas, Kansas City, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, and St. Louis – were quite small, 
each accounting for less than 5 percent.
11 
  Population figures give a somewhat different perspective on the size of Federal 
Reserve regions.  Nearly 20 percent of U.S. residents live in the San Francisco region.  
Atlanta and Chicago each lay claim to about 13 percent of the population, while New York 
ranks fourth with just under 10 percent.  Using GDP to evaluate region size produces a 
similar ranking.  The San Francisco region is largest (21 percent), followed by New York, 
Chicago, and Atlanta (each with about 11 percent).
12¸ 13 
  The final column of Table 1 gives another metric of region size:  the average number 
of votes cast by representatives of each region at meetings of the Fed’s monetary policy 
                                                 
9 Johnson (1995) provides a good summary of the founding of the Federal Reserve. 
10 See Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1990. 
11  It is interesting to compare the 1990 distribution of Reserve Bank assets with what existed shortly after the 
founding of the system in 1920.  While New York was by far the largest region with nearly one-third of total 
assets, Chicago and Cleveland were next in line with 15 percent and 10 percent, respectively.  The San 
Francisco bank ranked sixth.  The change in distribution from 1920 to the present day is consistent with the 
increase in economic activity in the western part of the United States over that period. 
12 For U.S. states that fall into more than one Federal Reserve region, population shares were used to allocate 
state output across regions.  (Population can be estimated precisely by aggregating across all counties in a 
Federal Reserve regions, as counties are not split.)  Fourteen U.S. states are assigned to more than one Federal 
Reserve region. 
13 The land area of each district in square miles gives yet another picture of size.  By this measure, San 
Francisco is far and away the largest, followed by three other mid-western regions – Dallas, Minneapolis, and 
Kansas City.   8
committee, the FOMC.
 14  The FOMC comprises the seven Board members, the President of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and four of the other eleven Bank presidents who 
vote on a fixed rotation.
15  Each of the seven Board members hails from a different region.  
The calculations on average votes cast take into account the regional affiliations of Board 
members as well as those of Bank presidents. 
  In our sample of 345 meetings
16 between 1968 and 2000, the New York region cast 
nearly 2 votes on average at each meeting, outstripping the other regions by a sizable margin.  
Five of the regions cast about one vote per meeting (Boston, Dallas, Kansas City, 
Philadelphia, and San Francisco), while two had somewhat more influence (Chicago and 
Richmond) and four had considerably less influence (Atlanta, Cleveland, Minneapolis, and 
St. Louis).   
  Table 2 provides the statistics on size as a rank ordering from the largest to smallest 
Federal Reserve region (numbered 1 to 12, respectively).  Somewhat surprisingly, the 
average number of votes cast by Federal Reserve regions in monetary policy decision bears 
little relationship to our measures of economic size.  Some regions – for example, Chicago, 
Minneapolis, and St. Louis – have a voice in monetary policy that about accords with their 
size.  Atlanta and Cleveland have generally had less of a voice in policy decisions than their 
size would suggest is appropriate, while Philadelphia has had substantially more.  New York 
and San Francisco are arguably the largest; while New York has had the most influence on 
monetary policy, San Francisco ranks far below New York in terms of votes cast. 
 
Monetary Policy Votes 
 
The sample of FOMC voting records used in our empirical analysis consists of 214 meetings 
conducted face-to-face and via conference call from 1978-2000.
17  Summary information 
                                                 
14 The FOMC was not established until the 1930s.  The policymaking structure envisioned under the 1913 
legislation that created the U.S. central bank was quite different from the FOMC particularly with respect to the 
distribution of power between the centralized hub and the twelve spokes.  See Meade and Sheets (1999).  
15 A 1942 amendment to the Federal Reserve Act prescribed a rotation of four seats on the FOMC among eleven 
Federal Reserve districts (excluding New York).  This annual rotation began on March 1, 1943; since 1990, the 
rotation has taken place each year on January 1.  One voting seat is rotated in a fixed fashion among: Cleveland 
and Chicago; Atlanta, Dallas, and St. Louis; Boston, Philadelphia, and Richmond; Kansas City, Minneapolis, 
and San Francisco.  
16 The sample includes meetings conducted face-to-face and via conference call. 
17 The annual number of meetings, face-to-face and via conference call, varies over the sample.  In 1978 (and in 
earlier years), face-to-face meetings numbered 12 per year.  A formal change reduced the annual number to 8 in 
1981.  Conference calls at which votes were recorded have been rare since 1982.  Between 1978 and 1982, such 
calls were important in the policy process and the frequency likely reflects the significant changes in Fed 
operating procedures and leadership during those years.  (Conference calls at which votes were not recorded are 
excluded from our analysis.)  Data frequency is shown in the table below:   9
from this voting sample is displayed in table 3.
18  Votes by FOMC member are recorded in 
the minutes for each meeting.  Currently, the Federal Reserve publishes the minutes for each 
meeting with a lag of about six weeks. 
In general, dissents were about 8 percent of total votes cast over the 1978-2000 
period.  Board members were somewhat less likely than Bank presidents to dissent, with 
dissent rates of 7.7 percent and 8.9 percent, respectively.  The finding that Board members 
are less likely to dissent has been noted consistently in other studies, despite a wide range of 
time periods examined. 
For a dissenting voter, meeting minutes generally indicate the reasons for the dissent 
from which it is possible to discern the dissenter’s desired policy stance relative to the 
majority.
19  Of the 198 dissents registered in our sample (out of 2403 votes cast),
20 exactly 
two-thirds or 132 votes were dissents for tighter monetary policy while one-third or 66 votes 
were dissents for easier monetary policy.  That is, dissenters were twice as likely to want 
greater monetary restraint as opposed to lesser monetary restraint than the majority of FOMC 
members. 
Table 3 provides information on voting patterns by Federal Reserve region, taking 
into account the affiliations of both Board members and Bank presidents.  Over the sample 
period studied, Bank presidents from Cleveland, Richmond, and St. Louis registered dissent 
rates near 20 percent of votes cast (the number of dissenting votes was 20, 17, and 14, 
respectively).  Bank presidents from Dallas and Minneapolis dissented more than 10 percent 
of the time (dissents totalled 8 and 10, respectively).  Among Board members, dissent rates 
were nearly 18 percent for those hailing from the regions of Boston and Chicago.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
  Face-to-face  Calls    Face-to-face  Calls 
1978  12  8  1988  8  1 
1979  9  4  1989-97  8  0 
1980  11  6  1998  8  1 
1981  8  2  1999-00  8  0 
1982-87  8  0  Total  192  22 
 
18 Similar summary results are obtained using a longer voting sample that begins in 1968.  The longer voting 
sample was not used in our logit regressions owing to the lack of availability of monthly state-level 
unemployment data prior to 1978. 
19 For example, if the minutes indicate that the dissenting voter feared that the economy was growing too rapidly 
and thought there was a greater threat of rising prices than acknowledged by the committee, then this voter was 
judged to have dissented in favor of tighter monetary policy.  Two dissents (cast by Bank presidents Solomon of 
New York in 1981 and Horn of Cleveland in 1982) were not used in our empirical analysis because they were 
ascribed to “technical” reasons (something other than the stance of monetary policy, such as monetary policy 
operating procedures, for example). 
20 The number of total votes cast in our sample (2403) is slightly less than the potential number of votes (214 
meetings and calls x 12 FOMC members = 2568) owing primarily to absences of Board members or vacancies 
on the Board.  (An alternate typically votes for an absent Bank president.)   10 
Interestingly enough, all of the 31 dissents cast by the Boston member of the Board were in 
favour of tighter monetary policy, while all of the 31 dissents cast by the Chicago member 
were in favour of easier monetary policy.
21 
 
Importance of regional identity 
 
In other studies of FOMC voting, the regional identity of Board members has been ignored.  
Many of the studies presume implicitly that Board members retain no regional loyalty, but 
rather represent the federal bureaucracy in Washington and maintain an affiliation with the 
political party of the President who appointed them.  By including the regional identities of 
Board members in our work, we are able to assess the assumption made in previous studies 
that the regional link is not significant.  The importance of this regional tie is ultimately an 
empirical question. 
The 1913 Federal Reserve Act requires that Board members come from different 
regions.  This requirement reflected fears that regional interests – those of Main Street or 
Wall Street – could come to dominate monetary policy.  Thus, at the time of the System’s 
founding, diversity on the Board was intended to promote policies that were nationally 
oriented and not overly sensitive to sectoral developments. 
More recently, in 1996, President Clinton reportedly wanted to nominate Felix 
Rohatyn, a New York investment banker, to a vacant seat on the Fed’s Board.  As there was 
already a Board member (Alan Greenspan) from the New York region, consideration was 
given to nominating Rohatyn to the Kansas City seat because he owned vacation property in 
Wyoming.  Rohatyn’s name was eventually dropped, owing in part to anticipated difficulties 
with Senate confirmation for the Fed position (see Woodward, 2000). 
A similar residency test surfaced in the Senate hearings for Lawrence Lindsey in 
1991, although it did not de-rail the confirmation.  After Lindsey answered several questions 
from Senator Paul Sarbanes about his long-term affiliation  with Harvard University, the 
following exchange was recorded (see Hearings, pp. 45-46; italics added for emphasis): 
 
Senator Sarbanes.  All right.  Now, for what geographic region are you being appointed 
to the Board to represent? 
Mr. Lindsey.  I’m representing the Richmond Federal Reserve District. 
                                                 
21 Over the 1978-2000 period, the Boston seat was occupied by Henry Wallich, John LaWare, and Roger 
Ferguson, while the Chicago seat was filled by Nancy Teeters, Martha Seger, and Susan Phillips.   11 
Senator Sarbanes.  What’s your connection with the Richmond Federal Reserve 
District? 
Mr. Lindsey.  I own a house in Virginia.  It’s the only house that my wife and I own.  I 
pay income taxes there, personal property taxes there, vote there.  We’ve actually spent 
half our married life there, in two stints. 
Senator Sarbanes.  How much of your life have you spent there? 
Mr. Lindsey.  Five years. 
Senator Sarbanes.  Out of how many? 
Mr. Lindsey.  Thirty-six. 
Senator Sarbanes.  Well. Half of your married life is not highly relevant to the nexus 
with the Richmond Reserve District, is it? 
Mr. Lindsey.  Well, Senator, my – 
Senator Sarbanes.  Why do you think that requirement is in the law, in the Federal 
Reserve law?  Why was it put there?  Why do we have a geographical requirement? … 
Wasn’t one intent at least to get people from different regions of the country who 
participated in the economic life of their region to sit on the Federal Reserve Board 
making nationwide monetary policy? … I don’t understand how you under any stretch 
of the imagination would meet that criteria for the Richmond Reserve District. 
 
Finally, transcripts from FOMC meetings offer some interesting insights into the 
regional identities of Fed Board members.  Martha Seger, a Board member from 1984 until 
1991, frequently mentioned economic developments in her home region of Chicago (which 




My basic reason for going this way is that I’m impressed by the slowing that I see in 
the economy.  Certainly, at least in the Detroit area, [economic activity] is way above 
where it was two years ago and yet the rate of increase is definitely slowing.  And I’m 
also impressed by the chances for an auto strike this fall.  (Federal Open Market 
Committee Transcripts, July 1984, p. 41; Seger voted with the majority to hold 
monetary policy unchanged.) 
 
                                                 
22 These are just two of multiple instances in which Seger makes reference to developments in her home region 
of Chicago.   12 
I have just a couple of comments, primarily based on some conversations I had with 
people in the auto industry….  As I looked at the general statistics, I thought the 
consumer looked as if he or she was pretty tight-fisted…. People point to auto sales as 
some sort of exception, but at least the people I spoke with in the auto industry are not 
putting that kind of interpretation on this….  (Federal Open Market Committee 
Transcripts, March 1988, p. 49; Seger dissented for easier monetary policy.) 
 
Although these examples do not provide definitive evidence that regional developments 
influence Board members, they at least suggest that regional considerations are sometimes 
a factor in voting patterns. 
 
Votes and regional unemployment 
 
Our statistical analysis suggests that FOMC voting patterns are not insensitive to labour 
market conditions in Federal Reserve regions.  We constructed monthly unemployment rates 
for each Federal Reserve area by weighting state unemployment rates by population shares in 
each region.
23  We examined the difference between the regional and national unemployment 
rate for each month of an FOMC vote.  Table 4 provides a frequency distribution of this 
difference in unemployment rates sorted by vote (votes with the majority, dissents in favour 
of easier policy, and dissents in favour of tighter policy).  The next three paragraphs discuss 
these striking results in some detail. 
Over the 1978-2000 period, FOMC voters, on average, had regional unemployment 
rates that were a touch below (0.1 percentage point) the national average.  This suggests that 
the balance of power on the FOMC was tilted slightly toward regions with relatively strong 
economic performance. 
FOMC voters dissenting in favour of easier monetary policy had regional 
unemployment that was above the national rate by an average 0.5 percentage point.  A t-test 
strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the mean difference in regional and national 
unemployment rates for these voters is equal to the mean difference for all votes cast.  
Notably, when the unemployment rate in a member’s region was more than 1.5 percentage 
points below the national average, the member dissented for easier policy just 1.3 percent of 
                                                 
23 Monthly unemployment data for all U.S. states except California begin in 1978; data for California are 
available from 1980.  Population shares for each state in a Federal Reserve region were constructed at the 
county level using data from the 1990 Census.  (The unemployment rate for the San Francisco region in 1978-79 
was calculated by re-normalizing the population weights to exclude California for these two years.)   13 
the time.  In contrast, when the unemployment rate in a member’s region was more than 1.5 
percentage points above the national average, the member dissented for monetary easing 9.9 
percent of the time. 
FOMC voters dissenting in favour of tighter policy had lower regional (relative to 
national) unemployment rates; the mean difference was minus 0.7 percentage point.  A t-test 
strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the mean difference in unemployment rates for these 
voters is equal to the mean difference for all votes cast.  The details of these results are 
roughly symmetric to those discussed in the previous paragraph.  In those instances when the 
unemployment rate in a member’s region was below the national average, the member 
dissented in favour of tightening 7.5 percent of the time but dissented in favour of easier 
policy only 1.6 percent of the time.  Conversely, no member dissented in favour of tighter 
policy when his region’s unemployment rate was more than 1.5 percentage points above the 
national average.  However, when the unemployment rate in a member’s region was more 
than 1.5 percentage points below the national average, he dissented in favour of tighter policy 
9.8 percent of the time. 
Table 5 provides the frequency distribution sorted by Board members and Bank 
presidents.  The Board member results provide compelling evidence that dissenting votes are 
associated with large differentials between regional and national unemployment rates.  On 
average, Board members dissent for easier monetary policy when the region’s unemployment 
rate is 0.7 percentage point higher than the national unemployment rate, and dissent for 
tighter monetary policy when the region’s unemployment rate is 1.1 percentage points lower 
than the national rate.  The null hypothesis that the mean difference in unemployment rates 
for easing or tightening dissents is equal to the mean difference for all votes cast is strongly 
rejected. 
The results for Bank presidents lend some limited support to the view that regional 
unemployment differentials influence voting behaviour.  Over the sample period, Bank 
presidents dissented for tighter policy when the national unemployment was 0.4 percentage 
point above the region’s rate.  A t-test rejected the null hypothesis that this mean difference 
was equal to the mean difference for all votes cast by Bank presidents.  In addition, Bank 
presidents dissented in favour of tighter policy with 9.9 percent probability when the 
unemployment rate in their region was below the national average, but only 5.2 percent of the 
time when the unemployment rate in their region was above the national average.  
Differentials in unemployment rates, however, do not seem to help explain the observed 
pattern of dissents by Bank presidents in favour of easier policy.   14 
Another important observation can be drawn from Table 5.  Dissenting votes cast by 
Board members were split about evenly between dissents in favour of easing and dissents in 
favour of tightening.  Bank presidents dissented for tighter policy six times more frequently 
than they dissented for easier policy. 
 
 
5.  Empirical Results 
 
The sample of FOMC votes from 1978-2000 was used to define a limited dependent variable 
VL as in equation (6).  Ordered logit was used to estimate the voting equation.  We deemed 
this empirical technique more appropriate for addressing our problem than multinomial logit, 
commonly used in other studies of FOMC voting.  Ordered logit takes advantage of the 
information provided by the implicit ordering of the dependent variable (where votes in the -1 
category reflect a preference for easier monetary policy than votes in the 0 category, and 
votes in the +1 category reflect a preference for tighter monetary policy than votes in the 0 
category) to produce a single set of coefficient estimates and standard errors along with 
estimated threshold parameters or break points for each category. 
Our initial specification of the ordered logit equation included a large set of 
independent variables, with characteristic, regional, and national variables as listed on Table 
6.  The regional and national variables were lagged one month relative to the date of the 
FOMC meeting.
24 
Characteristic binary variables were used to detect differences in voting behaviour 
between officials from the main office and the regional offices (BOARD), between face-to-
face meetings and conference calls (MTG), under different Federal Reserve chairmen during 
the sample period (MILLER and VOLCKER),
25 and following the revelation that meetings 
were being tape-recorded (TAPE). 
Regional economic developments were represented in the initial specification by the 
difference between the unemployment rate in the FOMC voter’s region and the national rate 
(UNDIFF).  In addition, we tested a regional “gravity” unemployment rate (GRVUND) for 
each region that was a distance-weighted average of the unemployment differentials for the 
                                                 
24 For the most part, the time series variables are released with a one-month lag.  Availability at the time of an 
FOMC meeting depends on when during a particular month a meeting occurred, but we deemed a one-month 
lag to be a reasonable approximation to the information set available to policymakers. 
25No binary variable was included for Arthur Burns, who resigned as chairman at the end of January 1978.  
Estimation of the regression begins in March 1978, owing to lags in the independent variables.    15 
eleven other regions.  The gravity unemployment variable was intended to detect whether 
votes were sensitive to developments in regions that were close neighbours to the home 
region of the voter.  Finally, we added two variables designed to pick up non-linear effects in 
extreme cases:  TAILH, a dummy set equal to one for values of UNDIFF greater than or 
equal to 1.5; and TAILL, a dummy set equal to one for values of UNDIFF less than or equal 
to minus 1.5. 
National variables measured the change in and the level of real economic activity 
(growth in industrial production, IP; output gap, G AP; and unemployment rate, UN) and 
inflationary pressures (change in consumer prices, CPI) in the month prior to the FOMC vote.  
In addition, we experimented alternately in the initial specification with two measures of 
short-term interest rates:  the Fed  funds rate of the week prior to the FOMC vote 
(FEDFUND), and a variable that indicated whether monetary policy had been tightened, 
eased, or left unchanged at the previous FOMC vote (STANCE).  These variables were 
included to test whether dissents are sensitive to the level of monetary stimulus in the 




Initial estimation results are shown in Table 7.  Our estimation strategy was as follows:  from 
the two initial specifications, we eliminated explanatory variables based on statistical 
significance to arrive at the preferred equation, on which we focus our attention.  Surprisingly 
few of the explanatory variables included initially survive in the preferred specification.  In 
particular,  no national variables appear to explain the decision to vote with the FOMC 
majority or against it.  While national variables are critical in setting the overall stance of 
monetary policy, these variables do little to explain the tighter or easier policy preferred by 
dissenters.
26  The estimated coefficient on the regional variable UNDIFF is negative and 
highly statistically significant, indicating that a rise in the regional unemployment rate of the 
voter (for a given national rate) raises the likelihood of an easing dissent and reduces the 
likelihood of a tightening dissent (and conversely for a decline in regional unemployment).  
The significant, negative coefficient on the BOARD variable indicates that Board members 
are more likely than Bank presidents to dissent for easier policy and less likely than Bank 
                                                 
26 It may be the case that national economic variables do explain the voting behavior for a particular individual 
or district bank.  However, these variables are not important determinants across all Board members or voting 
Bank presidents.   16 
presidents to dissent for tighter policy.  This result is consistent with the general finding in 
the FOMC voting literature that Bank presidents tend to be more hawkish than Board 
members. Meetings conducted face-to-face are associated with a significantly greater 
likelihood of a dissent for tighter policy than meetings held via conference call.  Roughly 
one-half of all conference calls result in a tightening of monetary policy (only 20 percent for 
face-to-face meetings), resulting in a reduced likelihood of a tightening dissent for calls.
27  
During the Miller chairmanship, there was greater likelihood of a tightening dissent, 
presumably reflecting disagreement over the appropriate stance of policy during a period of 
very high inflation. 
Table 8 displays estimation results for six alternative specifications of the preferred 
equation.  We discuss each alternative specification before turning to the marginal effects. 
In the first alternative specification, the  chairman’s votes are dropped from the 
sample.  The Fed chairman plays a unique role in FOMC meetings, by making the policy 
proposal on which other members vote; by construction, therefore, the chairman never 
dissents.
28  The coefficients and t-ratios estimated when the chairman’s votes are excluded 
are nearly identical to the empirical results obtained using the entire voting sample. 
The second and third alternative specifications split the sample into votes cast by 
Board members in the central bank’s main office and votes cast by Bank presidents from the 
central bank’s regional offices, respectively.  The coefficient on the UNDIFF variable is 
much larger for Board members (alternative 2) than for Bank presidents (alternative 3), 
although both voting samples yield a significant, negative parameter estimate.  These results 
suggest that it is officials in the central bank’s main office, rather than those in its regional 
offices, who demonstrate greater sensitivity to regional developments. 
In the United States, central bankers are concerned not with the unemployment rate 
per se, but with the deviation of unemployment from its natural rate.  As constructed, the 
unemployment differential UNDIFF does not correct for the natural rate, and this may pose a 
problem particularly if a region’s natural rate differs from the national one.  To address this 
issue, we decomposed UNDIFF two components representing its longer-run average 
                                                 
27 In many instances, if the economic horizon appears somewhat uncertain at a face-to-face meeting, 
policymakers will agree to defer a decision to a conference call when more economic information has become 
available. 
28 Blinder et al (2001) discuss the powerful role of the Fed’s chairman as follows (p. 39):  “The Fed’s FOMC 
does vote in a formal sense, but it is widely known that individual members often do not vote their true 
preference.  Instead, each committee member decides whether to support or oppose the chairman’s policy 
recommendation, which is almost always made first.  And Fed traditions dictate that a member should ‘dissent’ 
only if they find the majority’s (that is, the chairman’s) opinion unacceptable.”   17 
(STRUC) and shorter-term deviation (CYC), as follows:  STRUC was defined as the 
difference in 5-year centered moving average means of the regional unemployment rate and 
the national unemployment rate;
29 CYC was defined as the difference between the demeaned 
regional and national unemployment rates.  In alternative specification four, the parameter 
estimate for STRUC is highly significant, negative, and relatively large in magnitude, while 
the CYC coefficient is insignificant.  This result suggests that policymakers respond to 
longer-term movements in the unemployment differential.
30 
In the fifth alternative specification, we added dummy variables to detect the 
importance of regional identities for Board members and Bank presidents.
31  While the 
estimated coefficient on UNDIFF remains negative and highly significant in this alternative, 
the magnitude of the parameter drops with the inclusion of the regional dummy variables.  
We discuss the estimated regional dummies further below. 
In the sixth alternative specification, we combined the UNDIFF decomposition with 
the regional dummy variables.  Once again, the inclusion of the regional dummies results in a 
decline in the magnitude of the regional variable (in this case, STRUC). 
Our testing demonstrates that the importance of the unemployment differential is 
robust to a variety of specifications.  The unemployment differential has a negative, 
statistically significant effect on votes cast by central bankers.  Although the estimated impact 
of this differential diminishes if regional dummy variables are included in the estimation, the 
resilience of the result is striking. 
In hopes of broadening the set of regional variables to include financial information, 
we constructed monthly data on bankruptcies by Federal Reserve region.  We gathered 
monthly FDIC data on bankruptcies at the county level for number of failed institutions, 
value of assets at failed institutions, and value of deposits at failed institutions; from these 
county-level data, we constructed regional variables.  We estimated many equations adding 
the bankruptcy measures in different ways, but this indicator never proved to be statistically 
important in explaining voting behaviour. 
 
 
                                                 
29 Regional unemployment rates were constructed by interpolating annual data for the states prior to 1978. 
30 We also tested an equation in which CYC was included but STRUC was omitted.  In that case, the coefficient 
on CYC was significant and negative. 
31 The omitted region was New York.  In the case of Board members, there were not enough observations to 
estimate dummy variables for regions 4 and 9 (Cleveland and Minneapolis, respectively).   18 
Marginal effects 
 
Table 9 displays marginal effects for the preferred specification and the six alternative 
specifications.  The marginal effects give the change in the likelihood of each voting category 
for a small change in an explanatory variable.
 32 
  For the preferred equation, membership on the Fed’s Board reduces the probability of 
dissenting for tighter monetary policy by 4.2 percentage points and increases the likelihood of 
agreement with the majority or dissenting for easier policy by 2.4 and 1.8 percentage points, 
respectively.  At a face-to-face meeting of the FOMC, members are much more likely to 
register a tightening dissent and much less likely to register an easing dissent (2.3 and 1.9 
percentage points, respectively) than during a conference call.  Under Fed chairman Miller, 
policymakers were more likely to dissent for tighter policy and less likely to agree with the 
majority (by 3.7 and 2.6 percentage points, respectively).  Finally, an increase in a region’s 
unemployment rate relative to the national rate reduces the probability that a voter from that 
region will dissent for tightening by 2.3 percentage points.  The calculated marginal effects of 
the explanatory variables are nearly identical for the first alternative equation, in which the 
votes of the chairman are dropped from the sample.   
For alternatives two and three, it is interesting to compare the marginal effects for the 
UNDIFF variable.  An increase in a region’s unemployment rate (for a given national rate) 
reduces the probability that Board members and Bank presidents will dissent for tightening, 
but the reduction in probability for the former is larger (2.2 versus 1.5 percentage points, 
respectively).  As a result, Board members are more likely to dissent for easier policy, while 
Bank presidents are more likely to agree with the majority.  In alternative specification four, 
in which UNDIFF is replaced with its structural and cyclical components, the marginal 
effects for STRUC are very similar to those in the preferred equation. 
With the inclusion of regional dummy variables in alternatives five and six, the 
marginal effects reveal that Board members and Bank presidents from certain regions are 
associated with large changes in the probabilities of dissent and agreement relative to the 
respective member from the New York region.  For example, Board members from Boston, 
                                                 
32 Chapter 19 of Greene (2000) provides a good discussion of ordered logit and the derivation of marginal 
effects.  Marginal effects are computed by multiplying the estimated coefficient value by the probability density 
function evaluated over the relevant intervals (using the threshold parameters as interval break points), holding 
variables equal to their sample means.  For binary variables, the computation is somewhat different: the 
predicted value of the dependent variable is computed for the dummy set equal to one and set equal to zero 
(with all other explanatory variables set equal to their sample means); the marginal effect is the difference 
between the former and the latter.   19 
and to a lesser extent Kansas City and Dallas, are relatively less likely to agree with the 
majority and more likely to dissent for tighter policy.  Among Bank presidents, the regions of 
Cleveland and St. Louis are much more likely than the president from New York to dissent 
for tightening (shifting the probability by more than 20 percentage points) and 
correspondingly less likely to vote in agreement.  This is also true for Bank presidents from 
Atlanta and Minneapolis, although to a lesser extent.  With regional dummy variables in the 
equation, the shift in probabilities associated with the unemployment differential (UNDIFF 
and STRUC, respectively) diminishes considerably.  A rise in the unemployment rate gap 
between a region and the nation (alternative five) reduces the probability of a tightening 
dissent by 0.8 percentage points. 
 
 
6.  Implications for Europe 
 
The ECB’s Governing Council, which formulates monetary policy for the euro area, is 
composed of officials from the hub and the spokes of the currency area.  At present, the 
Council numbers 18:  six policymakers from Frankfurt and twelve national central bank 
heads (the main office and the regional offices of the central bank, respectively, from the 
earlier paradigm).  Unlike the Fed’s system in which voting rotates among policymakers from 
the regional offices, each of the 18 members of the ECB’s Governing Council casts a vote at 
every meeting.  For euro-area countries with two representatives on the Governing Council 
(Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain), the share in total votes cast is 11.1 
percent; for the remaining countries, the voting share is 5.6 percent. 
  As the European Union widens to include new countries to the east (perhaps as soon 
as 2004) and those countries join the euro area, the size of the Council will grow as new 
national central bank heads are added.  ECB policymakers could rise to number more than 
twenty.  As a result, policy discussions are likely to become increasingly unwieldy.  Thus, the 
ECB may want to consider reforming the composition of its Governing Council so as to 
reduce its potential size.  The agreement reached at the Nice Summit in December 2000 
opens the door for such a reform, permitting an amendment that does not require a change in 
the Maastricht Treaty.
33  While the structure of the Governing Council may not be changed, 
the Treaty of Nice permits a change in the voting rule; the current one-man-one-vote rule 
                                                 
33 For an excellent overview of the Treaty of Nice and its implications for the ECB, see Baldwin, Berglöf, 
Giavazzi, and Widgrén (2001).   20 
could be replaced by a rule that requires the rotation of votes among groups of policymakers 
or the grouping of policymakers into voting blocs. 
  The enlargement of Europe’s monetary union would not only increase the size of the 
Governing Council, it would also increase the relative number of policymakers from regional 
offices (heads of national central banks) relative to those from the main office in Frankfurt.  
Some have suggested that this shift in balance will make European monetary policy more 
subject to regional influence or the national biases of national central bank presidents (see 
Baldwin et al, pp. 77, 80-82).  The results in this paper suggest that the regional biases of all 
policymakers ought to be considered, and that one should not rule out the possibility that 
central bankers in Frankfurt are as nationally biased as national central bank presidents. 
  To examine whether national loyalties may have played a role in ECB  monetary 
policy to date, we performed an experiment that is inspired by our empirical results for the 
Fed’s FOMC.  We assumed that each member of the Governing Council casts his or her vote 
on the basis of the prior month’s difference between national and euro-area inflation rates.  
(In light of the ECB’s inflation objective and well-known problems with structural 
unemployment in European countries, we focused on inflation rather than unemployment in 
this exercise.)  We further assumed that if the national inflation rate differs from the euro-area 
average by more than a threshold value in the month prior to the monetary policy meeting, 
the Governing Council member will vote in a particular fashion.  For example, if national 
inflation is higher than euro-area inflation by more than the threshold value, then a 
policymaker from that country will vote in favour of monetary tightening or against monetary 
easing (and conversely if national inflation is below the euro-area average).  We looked at 
each instance of a change in ECB policy since January 1999, and calculated the aggregate 
number of Governing Council members who would have voted contrary to the actual 
monetary policy change that was made, given our voting rule and a number of different 
threshold values. 
  These results of this exercise, which are reported in Table 10, are striking and indicate 
that ECB monetary policy decisions are not inconsistent with the regional bias hypothesis.  
Based on a simple majority voting rule,
34 only in March 1999 with a threshold value of 0.25 
do we find a majority of Governing Council members who would have voted against the 
actual policy change that was announced.  That is, in nearly every case for every threshold 
value tested, the majority of ECB officials voted for a change in policy that can be justified in 
                                                 
34 According to the ECB, no formal vote is taken at meetings of the Governing Council and that all decisions 
reflect consensus.   21 
terms of the differential between their national inflation rate and the euro-area average.  
Proposals for reform of the Governing Council’s voting structure should consider in detail the 
ramifications of national biases on European monetary policy and potential voting structures 
that act to minimize these biases. 
  Baldwin et al favour a reform in which the six policymakers at the ECB’s centre cast 
votes on monetary policy, while the policymakers from the regions (the national central bank 
presidents) attend the meetings and participate in discussions, but do not vote.  Table 11 
provides the results of our experiment for these six officials.  Again, changes in euro-area 
monetary policy since January 1999 – had votes been cast only by the policymakers at the 
centre – have not been inconsistent with a voting rule based on inflation differentials.  While 
Baldwin’s proposed reform might streamline the ECB’s decision-making process and prevent 
the number of voters from growing with the enlargement of monetary union, it might not  
prevent policymakers from exercising national loyalties.22 




















Percent  Percent**  Millions  Percent  Billions 
of 1992 
Dollars 
Percent  Percent  Mean 
 



















2.  New York  125.2  38.2  29.0  24.1  9.7  718.1  11.9  1.5  1.92 
3.  Philadelphia  9.3  2.8  7.9  11.5  4.6  279.6  4.6  1.0  1.03 
4.  Cleveland  19.3  5.9  9.8  16.1  6.5  352.0  5.8  2.1  0.52 
5.  Richmond  22.3  6.8  4.5  23.3  9.4  579.6  9.6  4.3  1.20 
6.  Atlanta  16.3  5.0  4.4  31.8  12.8  667.6  11.1  7.0  0.58 
7.  Chicago  40.9  12.5  15.2  30.6  12.3  694.8  11.5  5.4  1.28 
8.  St. Louis  9.2  2.8  4.2  12.5  5.0  253.4  4.2  5.1  0.62 
9.  Minneapolis  5.5  1.7  2.6  7.6  3.1  167.7  2.8  11.6  0.40 
10.  Kansas City  9.7  3.0  4.3  13.5  5.5  294.1  4.9  14.0  0.99 
11.  Dallas  14.5  4.4  2.8  18.5  7.4  436.1  7.2  10.2  1.02 






















*Includes meetings conducted face-to-face and by conference call.  Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, selected issues. 
**Based on assets in 1920.  Source:  Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1914-1941 (1976). 
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1.  Boston  6  5  10  8 
2.  New York  1  1  4  2 
3.  Philadelphia  4  10  11  10 
4.  Cleveland  11  6  7  7 
5.  Richmond  3  4  5  5 
6.  Atlanta  10  7  2  4 
7.  Chicago  2  2  3  3 
8.  St. Louis  9  11  9  11 
9.  Minneapolis  12  12  12  12 
10.  Kansas City  7   9  8  9 
11.  Dallas  5  8  6  6 
12.  San Francisco  8  3  1  1 
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Table 3:  Votes of FOMC Members, 1978-2000 
 
 
  Total  Federal Reserve Region¹ 

























































Board  6.2  0.8  0.9  0.6  0.0  0.9  0.2  0.8  0.3  0.1  0.5  0.7  0.5 
Bank  5.0  0.3  1.0  0.3  0.5  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
 









































Board²   7.7  17.7  2.7  0.0  0.0  5.6   0.0  17.9  0.0  50.0  9.7  5.5  4.9 
Bank²  8.9  4.4  2.4   1.4  18.0  23.6  9.9   0.0  20.9  13.3  8.7  10.5  5.7 
 
Dissents in favor of (as share of total dissents): 
Tightening  67.0  94.0  40.0  0.0  90.0  68.0  100.0  0.0  79.0  91.0  88.0  81.0  33.0 
Easing   33.0  6.0  60.0  100.0  10.0  32.0  0.0  100.0  21.0  9.0  12.0  19.0  67.0 
 
¹Federal Reserve regions as follows:  1=Boston; 2=New York; 3=Philadelphia; 4=Cleveland; 5=Richmond; 6=Atlanta; 7=Chicago; 8=St. Louis; 9=Minneapolis; 10=Kansas 
City; 11=Dallas; 12=San Francisco. 
 
²In an extended sample of 345 meetings (face-to-face and conference call) between 1968 and 2000, dissenting votes were 7 percent of all votes cast.  The dissent rate of 
Board members was 5.8 percent, while that of Bank presidents was 8.4 percent. 
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2.0 < D = 2.5  40  10  0  50 
1.5 < D = 2.0  73  3  0  76 
1.0 < D = 1.5  158  6  12  176 
0.5 < D = 1.0  302  13  6  321 
0.0 < D = 0.5  435  12  16  463 
–0.5 < D = 0.0  400  9  23  432 
–1.0 < D = –0.5  369  6  20  395 
–1.5 < D = –1.0  206  3  32  241 
–2.0 < D = –1.5  116  1  15  132 
–2.5 < D = –2.0  43  1  1  45 
D = –2.5  49  1  7  57 
 
 























*Significant at the 99 percent level.  T-test compares the mean value of D in relevant column with mean value 
of D for total votes. 26 














































2.0 < D = 2.5  19  10  0  29 
1.5 < D = 2.0  38  3  0  41 
1.0 < D = 1.5  73  6  1  80 
0.5 < D = 1.0  150  11  2  163 
0.0 < D = 0.5  265  7  5  277 
–0.5 < D = 0.0  216  6  4  226 
–1.0 < D = –0.5  241  6  6  253 
–1.5 < D = –1.0  120  2  19  141 
–2.0 < D = –1.5  43  1  7  51 
–2.5 < D = –2.0  26  0  0  26 
D = –2.5  34  0  6  40 
 






















































2.0 < D = 2.5  21  0  0  21 
1.5 < D = 2.0  35  0  0  35 
1.0 < D = 1.5  85  0  11  96 
0.5 < D = 1.0  152  2  4  158 
0.0 < D = 0.5  170  5  11  186 
–0.5 < D = 0.0  184  3  19  206 
–1.0 < D = –0.5  128  0  14  142 
–1.5 < D = –1.0  86  1  13  100 
–2.0 < D = –1.5  73  0  8  81 
–2.5 < D = –2.0  17  1  1  19 
D = –2.5  15  1  1  17 
 









t-value  0.76  0.52  2.67*   
 
*Significant at the 99 percent level.  T-test compares the mean value of D in relevant column with mean value 
of D for total votes.27 

















Equal to 1 when voter from region i dissents for tighter monetary policy. 
Equal to 0 when voter from region i agrees with the majority. 




   
BOARD  0  Equal to 1 if vote cast by Board member, 0 otherwise. 
MTG  0  Equal to 1 if vote cast at face-to-face meeting, 0 otherwise. 
MILLER  0  Equal to 1 from March 1978 through July 1979, 0 otherwise. 
VOLCKER  0  Equal to 1 from August 1979 through July 1987, 0 otherwise. 
TAPE²  0  Equal to 1 from November 1993 through the end of sample, 0 otherwise. 
 
Regional variables: 
   
UNDIFFi  1  Unemployment rate in voter i’s region minus national unemployment rate, 
monthly. 
GRVUNDi  1  Gravity unemployment differential for voter i’s region calculated as the 
weighted-average of the unemployment differentials (UNDIFF) in the other 
eleven Federal Reserve regions, where the weights are inversely 
proportional to the distance in miles between the other eleven banks and 
bank i. 
TAILHi  1  Equal to 1 when the value of UNDIFFi is greater than 1.5; 0 otherwise. 
TAILLi  1  Equal to 1 when the value of UNDIFFi is less than –1.5; 0 otherwise. 
 
National variables: 
   
IP  1  1-month change in monthly industrial production. 
GAP  1  Output gap, monthly.³ 
UN  1  Unemployment rate, monthly. 







Fed funds rate, weekly (Wednesdays). 
STANCE  1  Equal to 1 when the FOMC majority tightens monetary policy. 
Equal to 0 when the FOMC majority leaves monetary policy unchanged. 
Equal to –1 when the FOMC majority eases monetary policy. 
 
¹Contemporaneous data are lag 0.  Column shows lags included in initial specification. 
 
²Intended to capture any change in voting behavior subsequent to the decision to release transcripts of FOMC 
meetings to the public after a lag of five years. 
 
³Computed as the difference between actual real GDP and potential real GDP, quarterly, where potential GDP 
was calculated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter; monthly data were interpolated using capacity utilization. 
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Table 7:  Coefficient Estimates (sample period:  1978-2000) 
 
 
















             
BOARD  –0.956  –5.9  –0.955  –5.9  –0.940  –5.8 
MTG  0.745  2.6  0.782  2.7  0.722  2.6 
MILLER   0.537  1.5  0.551  1.5  0.684  2.8 
VOLCKER  –0.055  –0.2  –0.201  –0.7     















GRVUND (–1)  0.454  1.6  0.414  1.4     
TAILH (–1)  –0.487  –1.3  –0.514  –1.3     











   
GAP (–1)  0.013  0.1  0.017  0.2     
UN (–1)  0.105  0.6  0.105  0.5     











   















THRESHOLD2  3.981  3.1  4.197  3.2  3.383  11.4   29 
Table 8:  Coefficient Estimates, Alternative Specifications 
 
 
1. Drop votes cast by 
FOMC Chairman 
2. Drop votes cast by 
Bank presidents 


















             
BOARD  –0.913  –5.7         
MTG  0.727  2.6  0.509  1.3  0.908  2.1 

















4. Replace UNDIFF with 
cyclical and structural 
5. Add regional dummies 
for Board and Bank¹ 
6. Replace UNDIFF and 

















             
BOARD  –0.944  –5.8         
MTG  0.726  2.6  0.724  2.5  0.724  2.5 















STRUC (–1)  –0.620  –7.7      –0.320  –3.0 
CYC (–1)  –0.236  –1.0      –0.392  –1.6 
 
BD1 








BD3      0.257  0.5  0.251  0.4 
BD5      –1.058  –2.3  –1.043  –2.2 
BD6      0.116  0.1  0.114  0.1 
BD7      –2.236  –6.0  –2.243  –6.0 
BD8      0.074  0.1  0.079  0.1 
BD10      1.443  3.0  1.459  3.0 
BD11      1.208  2.5  1.221  2.5 
BD12      –1.106  –2.1  –1.111  –2.1 
 
BK1 








BK3      –0.297  –0.4  –0.299  –0.4 
BK4      2.574  6.0  2.566  6.0 
BK5      2.842  6.6  2.859  6.5 
BK6      2.107  4.1  2.108  4.1 
BK7      0.241  0.4  0.233  0.4 
BK8      2.536  5.1  2.534  5.1 
BK9      1.862  3.8  1.888  3.8 
BK10      1.257  2.1  1.279  2.1 
BK11      1.229  2.1  1.243  2.2 
BK12      1.069  1.6  1.062  1.6 
 
¹BD4 and BD9 dropped owing to absence of observations. 
 
Federal Reserve regions as follows:  1=Boston; 2=New York; 3=Philadelphia; 4=Cleveland; 5=Richmond; 
6=Atlanta; 7=Chicago; 8=St. Louis; 9=Minneapolis; 10=Kansas City; 11=Dallas; 12=San Francisco. 
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MTG  –1.9  –0.4  2.3  –2.1  –0.5  2.6 



















2. Drop votes cast by Bank presidents 
 
 




VOTE  Pr[VL= –1]  Pr[VL= 0]  Pr[VL= 1]  Pr[VL= –1]  Pr[VL= 0]  Pr[VL= 1] 
 
BOARD 
           
MTG  –1.6  0.5  1.1  –1.4  –3.2  4.6 



































MTG  –1.9  –0.4  2.3 









CYC (–1)  0.5  0.5  –1.0 
 
¹By definition, the marginal effects sum to zero across categories. 31 



















         
MTG  –0.9  –0.4  1.3  –0.9  –0.4  1.3 















BD3  –0.2  –0.5  0.7  –0.2  –0.5  0.7 
BD5*  1.6  0.1  –1.7  1.6  0.1  –1.7 
BD6  –0.1  –0.2  0.3  –0.1  –0.2  0.3 
BD7*  6.3  –3.8  –2.5  6.4  –3.8  –2.6 
BD8  –0.1  –0.1  0.2  –0.1  –0.1  0.2 
BD10*  –0.8  –6.0  6.8  –0.8  –6.1  6.9 
BD11*  –0.7  –4.3  5.0  –0.7  –4.3  5.0 















BK3  0.3  0.3  –0.6  0.3  0.3  –0.6 
BK4*  –1.0  –19.4  20.4  –1.0  –19.3  20.3 
BK5*  1.6  0.1  –1.7  1.6  0.1  –1.7 
BK6*  –0.9  –13.1  14.0  –0.9  –13.1  14.0 
BK7  –0.2  –0.4  0.6  –0.2  –0.4  0.6 
BK8*  –0.9  –19.6  20.5  –0.9  –19.6  20.5 
BK9*  –0.9  –10.1  11.0  –0.9  –10.3  11.2 
BK10*  –0.7  –4.8  5.5  –0.7  –4.9  5.6 
BK11*  –0.7  –4.6  5.3  –0.7  –4.7  5.4 











   
STRUC (–1)        0.3  0.4  –0.7 
CYC (–1)        0.4  0.6  –1.0 
 
¹BD4 and BD9 dropped owing to absence of observations. 
 
*Underlying coefficient estimate significant at the 97.5 percent level. 
 
Federal Reserve regions as follows:  1=Boston; 2=New York; 3=Philadelphia; 4=Cleveland; 5=Richmond; 
6=Atlanta; 7=Chicago; 8=St. Louis; 9=Minneapolis; 10=Kansas City; 11=Dallas; 12=San Francisco. 32 




Number of Governing Council votes 
In support of monetary tightening or against monetary easing 
 
 
National minus euro-area inflation in month (-1) for different threshold values 
 
  Threshold value greater than or equal to 
  0.25  0.50  0.75  1.00  1.25  1.50 
Actual change in ST rate 
(basis points) 
 
March 1999  9  6  6  6  1  1  -50 
April 2001  7  7  7  6  4  3  -25 
July 2001  7  7  7  5  4  2  -25 







Number of Governing Council votes 
In support of monetary easing or against monetary tightening 
 
 
National minus euro-area inflation in month (-1) for different threshold values 
 
  Threshold value less than or equal to 
 
  -0.25  -0.50  -0.75  -1.00  -1.25  -1.50 
Actual change in ST rate 
(basis points) 
 
October 1999  5  3  0  0  0  0  50 
January 2000  6  2  1  1  1  1  25 
February 2000  5  4  0  0  0  0  25 
March 2000  5  3  0  0  0  0  25 
May 2000  5  0  0  0  0  0  50 
August 2000  5  0  0  0  0  0  25 
September 2000  3  0  0  0  0  0  25   33 




Number of Executive Board votes 
In support of monetary tightening or against monetary easing 
 
 
National minus euro-area inflation in month (-1) for different threshold values 
 
  Threshold value greater than or equal to 
  0.25  0.50  0.75  1.00  1.25  1.50 
Actual change in ST rate 
(basis points) 
 
March 1999  3  2  2  2  0  0  -50 
April 2001  2  2  2  2  1  1  -25 
July 2001  2  2  2  1  1  1  -25 







Number of Executive Board votes 
In support of monetary easing or against monetary tightening 
 
 
National minus euro-area inflation in month (-1) for different threshold values 
 
  Threshold value less than or equal to 
 
  -0.25  -0.50  -0.75  -1.00  -1.25  -1.50 
Actual change in ST rate 
(basis points) 
 
October 1999  2  1  0  0  0  0  50 
January 2000  2  0  0  0  0  0  25 
February 2000  2  2  0  0  0  0  25 
March 2000  2  1  0  0  0  0  25 
May 2000  2  0  0  0  0  0  50 
August 2000  2  0  0  0  0  0  25 
September 2000  1  0  0  0  0  0  25   34 
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